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IMPROVING JURY DELIBERATIONS:
A RECONSIDERATION OF LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Jury deadlocks in criminal cases create numerous problems. Unless
the trial judge can somehow break the deadlock, the jury will remain
''hung'' 1 and the judge must declare a mistrial. 2 If the state chooses to
pursue a conviction after a mistrial, it must either negotiate a guilty plea
with the defendant or repeat the trial process. If, however, the judge
wishes to avoid a hung jury and chooses to encourage the jury to reach
a verdict, the jury may be given further instructions designed to break
the deadlock. Such instructions may range in tone from relatively general
statements about the necessity of compromise, to more coercive instructions designed to achieve minority capitulation. 3
In some cases, the evidence presented at trial permits the judge to instruct the jury on offenses less s.erious than the crime charged - so-called
lesser included offenses. 4 These instructions can be presented in various

I. Professor Leo Flynn defined a hung jury as "a jury (I) which, in the judgment of the
court, has deliberated for a proper period of time, and (2) which has been discharged by the
court because there appears to be no reasonable probability that the jury can agree upon a verdict." Flynn, Does Justice Fail When the Jury is Deadlocked?, 61 JUDICATURE 129, 130 (1977).
Statutes and legal dictionaries have come up with similar definitions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CoDE
§ 1140 (West 1970); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 667 (5th ed. 1979).
2. See generally Schulhofer, Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 449, 486-90 (1977).
3. Instructions to induce compromises are commonly called "Allen instructions," after Allen
v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), in which the Supreme Court affirmed their use. See infra .
note 49.
4. Many courts, legislatures, and commentators have defined lesser included offenses. A composite definition, sufficient for the purposes of this Note, is those offenses the elements of which
are contained in the charged offense, or offenses which must be committed during the commission of the greater offense.
Professor Charles Wright provided a definition of "lesser included offense" and several useful
examples:
One offense is necessarily included in another if it is impossible to commit the greater
without also having committed the lesser. Thus murder includes such lesser offenses
as second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. Robbery necessarily
includes larceny, and assault with intent to rob. Rape necessarily includes assault with
intent to rape. Assault with a dangerous weapon includes simple assault. Theft of property in excess of $100 includes the lesser wrong of theft of property of value not exceeding $100. In each of these instances some of the elements of the greater crime charged
are in themselves enough to constitute the lesser crime.
The rule also provides in terms that the jury may find the defendant guilty of an
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ways, from restrictive instructions that may coerce minority jurors 5 by
requiring extended deliberations on the charged offense; to more flexible instructions that promote compromise on lesser offenses but that may
allow for quick decisions not based on the merits. Neither undue coercion nor unmerited compromise is a desirable outcome, but this is often
the only choice when the judge wishes to avoid a hung jury. Given such
a choice, this Note contends that the flexible, compromise approach is
preferred, both because coercion is legally and psychologically undesirable
and because juries will not abuse their power to compromise.
This Note approves of efforts to avoid hung juries by giving lesser
included offense instructions but opposes those instructions that restrict
juror decisions and coerce minority jurors. Rather, this Note offers a
lesser included offense instruction that promotes flexibility and jury compromise without undermining the deliberative process. Part I describes
the problem of hung juries and how courts have tried to prevent them
with restrictive lesser included offense instructions. Part II analyzes the
coercive impact of restrictive lesser included offense instructions and concludes that an instruction conditioning deliberations upon individual juror
disagreement better promotes compromises on the merits while reducing hung juries and juror coercion.
1.

AVOIDING HUNG JURIES WITH COERCIVE JURY INSTRUCTIONS

The American jury trial, despite a long and distinguished history, 6 has
been under constant fire by members of the bench and bar. 7 One facet
of jury trials is particularly vulnerable to criticism: hung juries. Attempts
to resolve these jury deadlocks also cause problems because efforts to
urge the jury to reach a verdict may be too heavy-handed and give the
judge undue influence over jury deliberations.

attempt to commit the offense charged - or an offense necessarily included therein
if an attempt is an offense.
3 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 515, at 21-23 (1982) (citations omitted).
5. Juror coercion, for the purposes of this Note, is any implicit or explicit influence, other
than the merits of the case, exerted by any individual connected with the trial, that convinces
a juror in the minority to change his or her vote. The type of coercion discussed in this Note
concerns supplemental judicial instructions or pleas of fellow jurors to abandon a position without
regard for its basis or reasonableness. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
6. For a lengthy and informative history of the jury trial, see L. MooRE, THE JURY: TOOL
OF KINGS, PALLADIDM OF LIBERTY (1973). Within the last 15 years, the Supreme Court has made
use of the jury's history to define the limits and requirements of the sixth amendment right
to a trial by jury. See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 407-10 (1972); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 87-99 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151-54 (1968).
7. See. e.g., J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 108-45 (1949). See generally H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 3-11 (1966); Forston, Sense and Non-Sense: Jury Trial Communication,
1975 B.Y.U. L. REv. 601, 601.
-

SPRING

Improving Jury Deliberations

1983)

A.

563

The Problem With Hung Juries

Of over 200,000 criminal jury trials for felony offenses in the United
States each year, 8 between five and twelve percent end in hung juries. 9
Consequently, at least 10,000 and perhaps more than 24,000 jury trials
end with the jury unable to agree on a verdict. These numerous stalemates
are the source of many problems.
A hung jury produces a wholly unsatisfactory conclusion to the criminal
trial for it is neither an acquittal nor a conviction. In forty percent of
the cases, the state opts not to retry the defendant. 1 ° For the defendant
who did not commit the crime, release after a hung jury and release after
an acquittal should make little difference, except for the benefit acquittal provides to an injured reputation. It is more likely, however, that the
defendant released following a hung jury did, in fact, commit some crime,
though not necessarily the principal crime charged. 11 For these technically

8. See H. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 117 (4th ed. 1980); Friedrich, We, the Jury, Find
the. .. , TIME, Sept. 25, 1981, at 45.
The number 200,000 is only a rough estimation. No government or private agency keeps records
on the number of jury trials each year. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 501-09.
Professors Kalven and Zeise! based their estimates of the annual number of jury trials on surveys
of local courts, correspondence with state officials, projections, and reports from judicial
conferences.
9. Two different studies have attempted to determine the number of hung juries. The first
study recording the number of hung juries was the "Chicago Jury Project," directed by Harry
Kalven, Jr., Hans Zeise!, and Fred Strotbeck of the University of Chicago, and sponsored by
the Ford Foundation. The study based its findings on court records, postdeliberation interviews,
simulated cases before experimental juries, and the recording of a limited number of actual jury
deliberations. Public opinion surveys were used to ascertain popular attitudes about the jury
system. Jury selection was also studied. See D. GILLMOR, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL 201 (1966).
In the process of analyzing court records, the study found hung juries occur in 5.507o of the
cases. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 57.
The second study was performed by Professor Leo Flynn at Pomona College. Flynn studied
three years of results of trials in California's IO largest metropolitan areas (8,021 jury trials
in felony cases, or 81 % of the felony trial litigation). He found that the jury hung 12.2% of
the time (978 cases). Flynn, supra note I, at 130.
Kalven and Zeisel's statistics are not inconsistent with Flynn's, though Flynn's proportion of
hung juries is higher than Kalven and Zeisel's. Kalven and Zeise! sought to determine the extent
and nature of disagreement between judges and juries. They mailed questionnaires to judges
and suspected that some judges may not have returned reports on mistrials. H. KAI.VEN & H.
ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 57.
10. See Flynn, supra note l, at 133.
II. In Flynn's study, 62.6% of the hung juries favored conviction; in 42.1% of the hung
juries, the vote favoring conviction was 9-3, 10-2, or 11-1. Flynn, supra note l, at 131-32. Kalven
and Zeise! reported similar findings; 6307o favored conviction and 441l7o favored conviction by
9-3 or more. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 460. Although the United States Constitution does not require unanimous jury verdicts in state criminal trials, see Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), most states require unanimity,
see E. PRESCOTT, FACETS OF THE JURY SYSTEM 9 (1976). Thus, verdicts of 9-3, 10-2, or 11-1
usually do not result in conviction, so researchers are cautious to mention that such vote splits
do not conclusively imply a defendant's guilt. See Flynn, supra note I, at 132; see also H. KAI.VEN
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"guilty" but legally free defendants the hung jury provides an unwarranted exemption from the penal function of the criminal justice system.
Even when the state reprosecutes, a second trial exacts a heavy price
from both society and defendants, regardless of the second trial's verdict. Second trials drain state treasuries of millions of dollars per year, 12
and add to the crowding of court dockets and delays in other cases. 13
The spectacle of retrials also endangers the legitimacy of the jury system.
If citizens are to respect the law in their everyday lives, and uphold it
as jurors, they must perceive the system as just and efficient. 14 Hung
juries give citizens the impression that the system works poorly. 15
Moreover, retrials jeopardize the interests of defendants due to the emotional and financial strain of successive defenses. 16 Given these drawbacks,
the best solution to hung juries would be to avoid situations in which
a hung jury can result.

B.

Lesser Included Offense Instructions as a Partial
Solution to Hung Juries

Instructions affecting deliberations on lesser included offenses could
lower the number of hung juries. Before one can understand the probable effect of different lesser included offense instructions, however, it
is important to understand the general background of the lesser included
& H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 461,489. Nonetheless, in investigations of 64 trials in nonunanimous
verdict states, Kalven and Zeise! found that juries hung only 3. I% of the time, or 45 % less
often. Id. at 461. This correlates closely with the percentage of vote splits favoring conviction
by nine or more jurors in states requiring unanimous jury verdicts. Flynn also found that, following
a hung jury, 34% of the defendants pied guilty and over two-thirds of the 26% retried were
convicted. Flynn, supra note I, at 133.
12. Flynn's study indicates that during a three-year period, hung juries cost the state of California $6.6 million. Flynn, supra note I, at 134. See also E. PRESCOTT, supra note 11, at 9; M.
SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT 85 (1978) (both commenting on the increased
deliberation time likely in cases ending in hung juries). See generally LAw REFORM CoMM'N OF
CANADA, CRIMINAL LAW - THE JURY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, WORKING PAPER 27, at 108 (1980).
13. See Jacobsohn, The Unanimous Verdict: Politics and the Jury Trial, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q.
39, 56-57.
14. A graphic manifestation of the loss of respect for the justice system occurred in Miami,
Florida, in the early summer of 1980. The acquittal of four former police officers of the beating
death of a black insurance executive led to widespread violence. In several days of rioting, 16
people died and over 400 were injured. Residents and the city lost over $100 million in property
damage. See Williams, Smith & Coppola, Three Days of Black Rage in Miami, NEWSWEEK,
June 2, 1980, at 34. Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti attributed the unrest to "a great perception
of injustice which has brought a sense of frustration and rage." N.Y. Times, May 20, 1980,
at Bll, col. I. Ironically, many lawyers blamed the trial's result on the prosecution's questionable
trial strategy of not trying to obtain jury compromise on a lesser offense. See Beck & Heckoff,
The McDuffie Case, NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1980, at 39.
15. Jacobsohn, supra note 13, at 57.
16. See LAW REFORM CoMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 108.
A guilty defendant does obtain some benefits from a hung jury, but these are not benefits
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offense doctrine. "Lesser included offenses" are offenses composed of
elements already contained in the charged offense, or that must be committed during the perpetration of the charged offense. 11 Typically, one
of the parties must request the instruction before it can be given, though
some states require their judges to consider the instruction regardless of
a request by the parties. 18 The instruction can only be given if, considering the evidence presented at the trial, the jury could properly convict
the defendant on some lesser included offense. 19 A defendant cannot be
found guilty of both the lesser and greater offenses. 20
..,
society is bound to protect. Free between trials, a defendant may engage in further criminal
activity. Additionally, a defendant may escape conviction because witnesses die, disappear, or
forget their testimony, or because the state cannot afford the time and expense of reprosecution.
See supra notes 9 & 11.
17. See supra note 4. See also Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349 (1965); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 3i(c); ALA. CODE§ 13A-1-9 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 43-2149 (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1157 (West 1981); IDAHO CoDE § 19-2311 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-9 (SmithHurd 1972); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-1-2 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3107(3) (1981);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14:5 (West 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 13A (1983); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.32 (1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.04 (West 1964); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-5 (1973); MONT. CoDE ANN.§ 46-11-501-2(a) (1981); N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW§ 1.20.37
(McKinney 1981); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.74 (Page 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 916 (West 1958); OR. REV. STAT.§ i36.460 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 40-18-II0(c) (1982);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.09 (Vernon 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-33-5, 77-33-6
(1978); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 23.3; Cow. R. CRIM. P. 31(c); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.510; KY. R. CRIM.
P. 9.86; N.D. R. CRIM. P. 31(c); R.I. R. CRIM. P. 31(c); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3l(c); MODEL PENAL
CoDE § 1.07(4)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
In United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1974), the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit summarized the requirements entitling a defendant to a lesser included offense
instruction:
(I) a proper request is made; (2) the elements of the lesser offense are identical to part
of the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is some evidence which would justify
conviction of the lesser offense; (4) the proof on the element or elements differentiating
the two crimes is sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense; and (5) there
is mutuality, i. e., a charge may be demanded by either the prosecution or the defense.
(emphasis omitted).
18. Only North Carolina, Tennessee, and Oklahoma require lesser included offense instructions sua sponte. See State v. Hicks, 241 N.C. 156, 84 S.E.2d 545 (1954); Strader v. State, 210
Tenn. 669, 362 S.W.2d 224 (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-169 (1978); TENN. CoDE ANN.
§ 40-18-ll0(c) (1982). Cf Barnett v. State, 560 P.2d 997 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (establishing
a court-imposed rule that request is not necessary for lesser included offense instructions when
the charge is first degree murder).
19. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); FED. R. CRIM. P. 3l(c); SA
J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 131.03 (2d ed. 1981); 4 W. TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE§ 545 (12th ed. 1976); Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Instruction - Problems
With Its Use, 3 LAND & WATER L. REv. 587 (1968). See generally Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 636 n.12 (I 980) (citing state and federal cases supporting the proposition that "a defendant
is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction where the evidence warrants it").
20. See Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551 (1961). In cases where the defendant was
convicted of both the greater and lesser offenses, the conviction for the lesser offense was vacated.
See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, 576 F.2d 794 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 851 (1978);
United States v. Lodwick, 410 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1969).
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The lesser included offense doctrine was developed as a way for the
prosecution to obtain a conviction in cases where it had overcharged or
was unable to prove some element of the crime. 21 Ironically, defendants
began to request the instruction because it allowed the jury to ''temper
justice with mercy" by finding the defendant guilty of only some lesser
offense. 22
Courts presently conflict over how to present the lesser included offense
instruction to juries. Generally, most courts have chosen one of two procedures: (1) the "acquittal" instruction under which the jury is required
to unanimously acquit the defendant on the charged offense before being
allowed to deliberate on any lesser included offense or (2) the "reasonable
doubt" instruction under which the jury can begin to consider lesser included offenses once they have reasonable doubt about guilt on the
charged offense.
1. The "acquittal" instruction- The acquittal instruction began as
part of the traditional requirement of jury unanimity 23 and was catalyzed
by pattern jury instructions used by the federal courts in the 1960's. 24
The instruction states that if jurors "should unanimously find the accused
'Not Guilty' of the crime charged in the indictment (information) then
the jury must proceed to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused
as to any lesser-included offense. " 25 The acquittal instruction has
been consistently upheld in most federal courts 26 and many state courts. 21

21. See 3 C. WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 514, at 20; see also Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
637-38 (1980); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 205 (1973); SA J. MOORE, supra note
19, 1 31.03(1].
22. See supra note 21.
23. See State v. Wall, 9 N.C. App. 22, 175 S.E.2d 310 (1970); State v. Payne, 199 Wis.
615, 227 N.W. 258 (1929); Dillon v. State, 137 Wis. 655, 119 N.W. 352 (1909); Ballinger v.
State, 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1968).
24. See W. MATHES & E. DEVITT, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 15.10 (1st
ed. 1965). See also infra notes 26-27.
25. E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS§ 18.05 (3d ed.
1977).
26. See United States v. Boffa, No. 81-2660, slip op. (3d Cir. Aug. 25, 1982); Pharr v. Israel,
629 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hanson, 618 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Jones, No. 77-1506, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Mar. 28, 1979); Catches v. United States, 582
F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1978); Fuller v. United
States, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United States v. Singleton, 447 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y.
1978).
27. See Nell v. State, 642 P.2d 1361 (Alaska App. 1982); Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal.
3d 503, 646 P.2d 809, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647 (1982); People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1981);
Johnson v. United States, 434 A.2d 415 (D.C. App. 1981); Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 12 Mass.
App. Ct. 562 (1982).
Many state courts have accepted the acquittal instruction implicitly. See, e.g., State v. Dippre,
121 Ariz. 596, 592 P.2d 1252 (1979) (holding that it was not erroneous for the judge to submit
a verdict form to the jury consisting of "guilty/not guilty" for each offense); Price v. State,
114 Ark. 398, 170 S.W. 235 (1914) (holding that a lesser included offense instruction is not
reversible if it conveys the idea that if the jury has reasonable doubt about guilt on any degree,
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The acquittal instruction promotes several important goals. By limiting
jury discretion, it requires conclusive deliberations on the charged offense. All jurors must agree on one charge before proceeding to the next;
consequently, attention will be paid to the opinions of minority as well
as majority jurors during the decision-making process. Permitting less
than unanimous agreement on the charge could discount the views of
dissenters, for their dissent might not alter the will of the majority. 28
Moreover, the requirement of unanimous acquittal guards against compromise verdicts that may be unrelated to the merits of the case.
Although courts recognize the jury's right to reach compromise
verdicts, 29 judges do not encourage such verdicts. In denying'judges the
authority to give lesser included offense instructions without request,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that "[t]o do
so 'serves only to encourage the jury to exceed its historical function
of factfinding' and 'exercise its mercy dispensing power' by convicting
on the lesser rather than on the greater charge.'' 30 The fear of jury compromise has prompted many courts and legislatures to restrict the scope
of the lesser included offense doctrine _by demanding that a party request the instruction before it can be used. 31
Limiting jury deliberations to one charge can impede the jury's ability
to reach a verdict. By indiscriminately preventing compromise the
acquittai instruction stops not only undesirable compromise, but desirable
they should acquit of that degree and fmd guilt of a lower degree about which there is no reasonable
doubt); People v. Dixon, 24 Cal. 3d 43, 592 P.2d 752, 154 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1979) (narrowly
construing situations in which statutory provisions requiring conviction of only the lesser offense
apply); State v. Troynack, 174 Conn. 89, 384 A.2d 326 (1977) (approving, in consideration of
a different issue, an instruction to the jury to consider the lesser offense if it did not find the
defendant guilty of the charged offense); State v. Leinweber, 303 Minn. 414, 228 N.W.2d 120
( 1975) (signaling lower courts to give lesser included offense instructions when the evidence supports conviction of the lesser crime and the defendant is not guilty of the charged offense).
The language of lesser included offense statutes in many states suggests that courts in those
states might uphold the "acquittal" instruction. These statutes use the terms "acquittal" and
"not guilty" in a way suggesting that they are prerequisites to guilt on a lesser included offense.
See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 2945.74 (Baldwin 1982); TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 40-2520 (1975);
VA. CoDE § 19.2-285 (1975). Other state rules of criminal procedure convey a similar impression.
See, e.g., LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 804; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.08 (Vernon 1981).
The Federal lesser included offense doctrine is the result of judicial interpretation of Rule
31(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See United States v. Tsanas, 572 F.2d 340,
344 (2d Cir. 1978). Many state rules of criminal procedure parallel the wording of Rule 31(c).
See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 23.3; FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.510; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 27(b); N.D.
R. CRIM. P. 31(c); R.I. R. CRIM. P. 31; VT. R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
28. Studies of nonunanimous final jury verdicts indicate that the majority neglects the views
of the minority because unanimity is not necessary for the verdict. See infra notes 56 & 58.
Once the requisite majority is reached, few attempts are made to persuade dissenting jurors.
See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
29. See Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
30. Lightfoot v. United States, 378 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. App. 1977). See also United States
v. Harary, 457 F.2d 471, 478-79 (2d Cir. 1972).
31. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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compromise as well. 32 Limiting deliberations to one offense can impede
the jury's ability to reach a verdict. Because the jury cannot discuss lesser
included offenses until agreeing to acquit on the charged offense, jurors
cannot rectify substantial disagreement by compromising on a lesser
offense composed of elements not disputed by the defendant or by the
jurors. 33 These restraints on compromise discussions thus fail to
ameliorate the hung jury problem.
Some courts have been pleased with the results of the acquittal instruction but reluctant to use such restrictive procedures on the jury. Because
the instruction sets out the specific deliberation agenda, jurors are left
with no discretion or room for compromise. To soften the impact of
their involvement in jury procedures, some judges have developed alternative instructions that are similar in effect but arguably less rigid.
2. The "reasonable doubt" instruction- Some courts have attemp32. Desirable and undesirable compromises are difficult to define and the distinction, to some
degree, is subjective. Generally, however, desirable compromises are motivated by the merits
of the case or a desire to seek justice through the proper channels. See infra notes 85-91 and
accompanying text. A compromise verdict resulting from the jury's concern that the prosecutor
overcharged is desirable. If the only alternatives are a hung jury, conviction of an offense more
serious than the defendant committed, or acquitting a guilty defendant, compromise should be
encouraged. On the other hand, compromise should not be facilitated when the compromise
does not serve a desirable purpose. For examples of unmerited compromise, see infra note 70.
33. This scenario assumes that jurors understand and follow the instructions that place them
in this predicament. For jurors to follow instructions, two things must happen: they must understand
the instructions when delivered, and choose to apply them when relevant to deliberations.
Many studies question the ability of jurors to understand common instructions as currently
written. See Charrow & Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic
Study of Jury Instructions, 79 CoLUM. L. REV. 1306 (1979); Elwork, Sales & Alfini, Juridic
Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or In Light of It?, 1 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 163 (1977);
Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478 (1976). A problem with these studies is that they do not take account of the jury's collective education and
memory. They did not, for example, allow deliberation on the meaning of the instructions,
and therefore neglected to mention that, on a 12-person jury, eight or nine jurors would have
understood the instruction correctly. If general psychological characteristics about jury deliberations apply, the majority will convince the minority of the correct interpretation. See infra note 40.
Even if the studies generally are valid, their conclusions do not apply to lesser included offense
instructions. The reasons given in the studies for lack of juror comprehension - unfamiliar terms,
abstract terms, use of negative language, ambiguous homonyms, and complex sentence structure do not exist in lesser included offense instructions. The only problem of incomprehensibility
might be with the "reasonable doubt" instruction. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
Once the jurors understand the instruction, they will apply it when deliberating. The jury studies
draw a distinction between instructions advising the jury to disregard certain information (usually
a prior criminal record) and instructions outlining the jury's task (defining offenses, explaining
deliberation procedures). Juries tend to follow task instructions but often do not follow instructions to disregard evidence. See Lind, The Psychology of Courtroom Procedure, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 30 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds. 1982) Researchers have taken instructions explaining difficult legal concepts, such as the definition of "insanity" and, by varying
them slightly, found that jurors responded by varying their likelihood of conviction. See, e.g.,
R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 66-77 (1967). Lesser included offense instructions seem to fit in the "task" category because they outline the procedures by which the
jury determines the verdict and do not require the jury to disregard something used during the trial.
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ted to soften the restrictive acquittal instruction by instructing jurors to
consider lesser included offenses only after a reasonable doubt exists about
the defendant's guilt on the charged offense. This "reasonable doubt"
approach instructs jurors that, "[i]f you are not satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense charged, or
you entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, you may consider [lesser included offenses]." 34
Courts adopting this "reasonable doubt" instruction contend that it
merely sets out a sequence of offenses for the jury to consider and does
not require agreement on the charged offense. 35 In practice, however,
the instruction is practically indistinguishable from the acquittal instruction. For instance, Michigan courts first accepted the reasonable doubt
instruction as an acceptable alternative to the "coercive" and "unduly
restrictive" acquittal instruction. 36 After eight years of use, however,
t_he Michigan Supreme Court held that the effect of the reasonable doubt
instruction on the jury was the same as that of the acquittal instruction. 37
Even if some courts fail to recognize the similarities between the two
instructions, juries probably do. The likely effect of the reasonable doubt
instruction is to encourage jurors to consider lesser included offenses
only after acquittal on the charged offense. The subtle legal distinctions
between the two standards are difficult to grasp. The concept of
reasonable doubt is technical, especially in the lesser included offense
context, and has been given a whole spectrum of meanings, some quite
counterintuitive. In addition, courts often confuse the two standards in
34. People v. McGregor, 635 P.2d 912, 914 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). This instruction has been
accepted in Georgia, Hawaii, and Wisconsin. See Evans v. State, 148 Ga. App. 422, 251 S.E.2d
325 (1978); State v. Santiago, 55 Hawaii 162, 516 P.2d 1256 (1973); State v. McNeal, 95 Wis.
2d 63, 288 N.W.2d 874 (Ct. App. 1980).
35. See Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. ll20
(1969); People v. McGregor, 635 P.2d 912 (Colo. App. 1981); Franey v. United States, 382 A.2d
1019 (D.C. 1978); Brownlee v. State, 155 Ga. App. 875, 273 S.E.2d 636 (1980); Evans v. State,
148 Ga. App. 422, 251 S.E.2d 325 (1978); State v. McNeal, 95 Wis. 2d 63, 288 N.W.2d 874
(Ct. App. 1980).
36. People v. Ray, 43 Mich. App. 45, 50, 204 N.W.2d 38, 41 (1972).
37. People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 623, 288 N.W.2d 207, 208 (1980).
Other courts, however, disagree. Many post-Mays decisions in other states have chosen to
uphold similar instructions despite recognizing the Mays decision. See Nell v. State, 642 P.2d
1361 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982); People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1981); People v. McGregor,
635 P.2d 912 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981). Even the Michigan appellate courts have been divided in
their response to Mays, limiting its scope to cases where the language of the trial judge's instruction copied the instruction rejected by the Michigan Supreme Court. Compare People v. Henderson, 113 Mich. App. 505, 317 N.W.2d 340 (1982) and People v. Handley, IOI Mich. App. 130,
300 N.W.2d 502 (overturning convictions following lesser included offense instructions) with People
v. Leverette, ll2 Mich. App. 142, 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982) (holding that the instruction did not
explicitly state that a verdict had to be reached on the greater offense before consideration of
the lesser offenses) and People v. Barker, JOI Mich. App. 599, 300 N.W.2d 648 (1980) (holding
that the instruction did not explicitly preclude the jury from considering the lesser included offense before considering the charged offense).
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practice, thus making the jury's task even more difficult. 18 The reasonable
doubt instruction also affects jury behavior in the same way as an acquittal instruction. Juries may view this instruction as requiring that the
entire jury have reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of the charged
offense - a standard requiring acquittal - before proceeding to the
lesser offense. 39
Despite the original intentions of judges first recommending it, in practice the reasonable doubt instruction is difficult to distinguish from the
acquittal instruction. Because of the confusion inherent in the reasonable
doubt instruction, jurors will not consider lesser included offenses until
they have decided to acquit the defendant on the charged offense. Consequently, the problems that plague acquittal instructions - coercion
and an inability to pursue reasonable compromise - also plague
reasonable doubt instructions.
Many courts are attempting to minimize the hung jury problem with
restrictive instructions that force juries to deliberate on the charged offense until reaching a conclusion. This approach admittedly produces
verdicts but at the loss of the free will of minority jurors, who are often
forced to go along with the decision because of judicial barriers to consideration of lesser offenses.
II.

AVOIDING COERCIVE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Both the acquittal instruction and the reasonable doubt instruction
have a coercive effect on jurors. Although some coercion may be
tolerable - and even necessary where a juror is unreasonably stubborn
- as a matter of principle it should be the exception, not the rule.

A.

The Problem With Coercive Instructions

Restrictive lesser included offense instructions may help avoid hung
juries, but only at the risk of another threat to the deliberation process:
38. Many courts upholding the reasonable doubt instruction cite acquittal instruction cases
for support. See, e.g., Fuller v. United States, 407 F.2d 1199 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1120 (1969); People v. Padilla, 638 P.2d 15 (Colo. 1981); Evans v. State, 148 Ga.
App. 422, 251 S.E.2d 325 (1978); State v. McNeal, 95 Wis. 2d 63, 288 N. W .2d 874 (Ct. App. 1980).
Some courts have denied that acquittal instructions ever require acquittal on the charged offense before consideration of lesser included offenses. See Pinson v. State, 251 S.W. 1092 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1923); see also People v. Walker, 58 Mich. App. 519, 228 N.W.2d 443 (1975).
39. The Michigan courts have realized that confusion, as well as coercion, can endanger jury
deliberations. In People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 288 N.W.2d 207 (1980), the Michigan Supreme
Court reversed a conviction following the reasonable doubt instruction and ruled that instructions
"convey[ing] the impression" that acquittal must precede lesser included offense deliberations
are erroneous. 407 Mich. at 623, 288 N.W.2d at 208. See also People v. Embry, 68 Mich. App.
667, 673, 243 N.W.2d 711, 714 (1976). See generally supra note 33.
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juror coercion. Minority jurors have three options once the jury appears
deadlocked: persuade the majority to reverse its views, hold out for a
hung jury, or change their own minds. It is rare that a minority can change
the majority's mind. 40 The jury either ''hangs'' or the minority changes
its mind. The shift in the minority vote may come from the majority
persuading the dissenters on the merits of the case, perhaps by pointing
out inconsistencies in testimony or attacking evidence. 41 Nevertheless,
many minority shifts stem from the majority engendering a feeling of
inferiority or unreasonableness in the minority. 42
Mindful of the trouble and expense of a second trial, judges sometimes
maximize this coercive effect. They may try to obtain a jury verdict even
after a long deadlock by refusing to declare mistrials or by giving supplemental instructions to compel a jury verdict. 43 They may make
statements to the jury emphasizing the need to reach a decision, the
burden the minority must undertake to convince the majority, the lack
of options, and the burden that dissent places on the majority jurors
and on the smooth functioning of the courts. 44 Judges intensify this coercive effect by givirig the acquittal instruction supplementally, or by
repeating it after the jury reaches an impasse. 45
40. Studies indicate that the initial minority on the jury usually loses out to the numbers
or the reasoning of the majority. The Chicago Jury Project found that 90% of the first-ballot
majorities determined the outcome. See H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 488. See also
M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, supra note 12, at 94-97 (reviewing the literature on group interaction
on juries and concluding that "[w]hether one is studying risk taking, ethical decisionmaking,
attitudes, negotiation and conflict, or jury decisionmaking, if the members initially lean in one
direction, the group interaction process draws them further in that same direction").
In many cases, appellate courts have held that the acquittal instruction had coercive effects
on verdicts. See People v. West, 408 Mich. 332, 291 N.W.2d 6 (1976); People v. Hurst, 395
Mich. I, 238 N.W.2d 6 (1976); People v. Summers, 73 Mich. App. 411,251 N.W.2d 311 (1977);
People v. Harmon, 54 Mich. App. 393, 221 N.W:2d 176 (1974); State v. Ogden, 35 Or. App.
91, 580 P.2d 1049 (1978).
When the case ends in a hung jury, it is likely that deliberations began with a large minority.
"It requires a massive minority of four or five jurors at the first vote to develop the likelihood
of a hung jury." H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 462.
41. See M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, supra note 12, at 96-98 (explaining deliberative processes after
the jury becomes divided).
·
42. Although it is difficult to determine the precise content of jury deliberations, it is possible to infer that many verdicts are the result of the minority accepting the majority's results
for reasons other than a true belief in that position. For anecdotal evidence, see supra note 70.
For evidence of that belief by legal commentators, see infra note 49. Appellate courts also feel
that illegitimate coercion could account for trial results. See infra notes 45-49.
43. See H. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 129.
44. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
45. Although the Devitt and Blackmar instruction, see supra note 25, is written for the judge
to give before jury deliberations begin, judges often give the acquittal instruction supplementally.
The acquittal instruction has been given supplementally in many cases during jury deadlocks.
See, e.g., People v. Harmon, 54 Mich. App. 393, 221 N.W.2d 176 (1974); People v. Ray, 43
Mich. App. 45, 204 N.W.2d 38 (1972); State v. Ogden, 35 Or. App. 91, 580 P.2d 1049 (1978);
Ballinger v. State, 437 P.2d 305 (Wyo. 1968). In each case, the jury returned a verdict of "guilty"
on the charged offense after receiving the instruction. With the exception of Ballinger, each court
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Such supplemental instructions create pressure on the jury. 46 Appellate
courts have responded _to this situation by occasionally reversing convictions obtained with the aid of such instructions. For instance, the judge
cannot demand a decision from the jury, 47 or inquire into the numerical
division of the jury, 48 or ask minority jurors to reconsider the
ruled that the instruction was prejudicial. See supra note 40.
The coercion implied by the supplemental acquittal instruction led the court in State v. Ogden
to consider the instruction a "modified Allen charge." 35 Or. App. at 94, 580 P.2d at 1051.
See infra note 49.
Regardless of when judges give the instruction, its coercive qualities are unaltered. Although
it is theoretically possible, if the judge gives the acquittal instruction before deliberations, for
the majority on the jury to change its conviction votes for acquittal to obtain a compromise
verdict on a lesser charge, this does not happen in practice. Current research on jury behavior
indicates that, once the majority has the advantage, it can and will use the instructions to get
its verdict.
46. Deliberations are a tense time. Jurors must make difficult decisions that are of vital_importance to the parties involved. In addition, minority jurors feel pressured by their need to
defend their position against a larger number of adversaries, and by the erosion of support for
their position. See Stasser, Kerr & Bray, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations: Structure, Process, and Product, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 241-47 (N. Kerr & R. Bray
eds. 1982). Under these circumstances, jurors are likely to feel coerced by judges calling them
out of the jury room to remind them of their duties and obligations. See LAW REFORM CoMM'N
OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 108-09; SA J. MOORE, supra note 19, 1 31.04[3); Schulhofer,
supra note 2, at 487.
In People v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977), the California
Supreme Court, in an extensive review of the Allen instruction, found certain supplemental instructions prejudicial. The court said that during a jury deadlock, the jurors are most susceptible to judicial influence and concluded, "[i]t is hard to conceive of circumstances in which
error is more capable of producing prejudicial consequences." Id. at 855, 566 P.2d at 1008,
139 Cal. Rptr. at 872.
47. Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965) (reversing, "under all the circumstances,"
a verdict that was prompted by the trial judge's supplemental exhortation, "(y]ou have got to
reach a decision in this case"); cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,
461 (1978) (upholding the reversal of convictions based on the jury foreman's understanding
of an ex parte comment by the trial judge that the case must be decided "one way or another").
But see United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1977) (using the "under
all the circumstances" test in Jenkins to deny habeas corpus claim where trial judge ignored
juror requests to suspend deliberations during the evening and the jury delivered a verdict at
3:22 a.m.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1076 (1978); United States ex rel. Anthony v Sielaff, 552 F.2d
588 (7th Cir. 1977) (using "under all the circumstances" language to find a lack of coercive
effect in polling the jury to determine prospects of agreement on a verdict despite circumstantial
evidence of coercion).
48. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 (1946) (reversing a conviction that followed the
judicial inquiry into the numerical division of the jury). State courts have differed in their application of the Brasfield rule because of doubts about its basis. Some state courts have followed
it based on federal constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 17 Md. App. 41, 299 A.2d
841 (1973); People v. Wilson, 390 Mich. 689, 213 N.W.2d 193 (1973); State v. Aragon, 89 N.M.
91, 547 P .2d 574 (1976). Others have denied that Brasfield is binding on state proceedings, either
because the decision was based on the Supreme Court's advisory power over the federal courts,
see, e.g., Cornell v. Iowa, 628 F.2d 1044 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981);
Ellis v. Reed, 596 F.2d 1195 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979); Sharplin v. State,
330 So. 2d 591 (Miss. 1976); State v. Morris, 476 S.W.2d 485 (Mo. 1971), or because the courts
decided that a factual inquiry into the coercive effect on the jury was more appropriate, see,
e.g., People v. Carter, 68 Cal. 2d 810, 442 P .2d 553, 69 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1968); Lowe v. State,
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reasonableness of their views. 49 Although acquittal and reasonable doubt
instructions have not typically been found to be excessively coercive, the
absence of legal coercive sanctions should not commend them to
widespread use. Indeed, judges overseeing jury trials should eschew ev_en
the potential for active coercion.
Nevertheless, a different form of lesser included offense instruction
may help prevent the disagreements that lead to hung juries and coercion. Rather than awaiting a deadlock and attacking it by forcing all
jurors to agree on one offense, modified lesser included offense instructions could be used to prevent deadlocks from occurring by promoting
discussion on a mutually agreeable compromise. Moreover, if properly
given, these instructions should not lead to unchecked jury discretion
or unmerited compromise.

B.

The "Disagreement" Instruction as a Solution to Coercion

Courts in Michigan and Oregon have attempted to avoid coercive
deliberations by adopting instructions that do not require any form of
175 Colo. 491,488 P.2d 559 (1971); Huffaker v. State, 119 Ga. App. 742, 168 S.E.2d 895 (1969);
Joyner v. State, 484 P.2d 560 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
49. The controversy about this instruction, called the "Allen instruction" or the "dynamite
charge," originated in Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). The Supreme Court, in
upholding the conviction, summarized the trial court's instruction:
[J)f much the larger number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider
whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impression upon the minds
of so many men, equally honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, upon the other
hand, the majority was for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether
they might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which was not concurred in by the majority.
Id. at 501. Because the instruction was effective at producing verdicts, it was rapidly accepted.
Although the United States Supreme Court has not reconsidered its position on the instruction, the modern trend is for courts to limit or abandon the Allen instruction. The Third, Seventh,
and District of Columbia Circuits have held that the instruction is coercive for almost all purposes. See United States v. Silvern, 484 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas,
449 F.2d ll77 (D.C. Cir. 1971); United States v. Fioravanti, 412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Panaccione v. United States, 396 U.S. 837 (1969). Other federal circuits have limited
the instruction by preventing judges from giving it too early in deliberations, see United States
v. Contreras, 463 F .2d 773 (9th Cir. 1972), by requiring an additional instruction that tells jurors
not to surrender honest, conscientious beliefs, see United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263 (9th
Cir. 1981), or by not permitting judges to give it more than once, see United States v. Bailey,
480 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Robinson, 560 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1977)
(affirming a conviction after the Allen instruction had been given twice, stating that coercive
impact increased with each appeal by the court to the jury, but each instance should be evaluated
in its circumstances), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978).
At least 23 states have disapproved Allen-type instructions, in whole or in part. See People
v. Gainer, 19 Cal. 3d 835, 566 P.2d 997, 139 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1977), (citing cases from 22 other
states and analyzing the debate over the Allen instruction). See generally SA J. MOORE, supra
note 19, 1 31.04(2); Marcus, The Allen Instruction in Criminal Cases: ls the Dynamite Charge
About to be Permanently Defused?, 43 Mo. L. REV. 613 (1977); Comment, An Argument for
the Abandonment of the Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 939 (1975).
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agreement on the charged offense before allowing discussion of lesser
included offenses. so This "disagreement" instruction directs the jurors
to consider the charged offense first, but unless they agree to convict,
they may consider any lesser included offense. s I Although only two states
recommend disagreement instructions, some federal courts have implicitly
accepted the standard. 52
The disagreement instruction can improve jury deliberations and reduce
the number of hung juries. It does this by offering the jury more decision alternatives, earlier in deliberations, on which the jury can arrive
at a mutually agreed-upon verdict. Critics contend that easing coercion
by promoting compromise is not likely to reduce hung juries. Alternatively, they argue that if it does, it will do so by causing the early abandonment of deliberations to reach a quick verdict upon a mutually agreeable,
but greatly reduced, offense, 53 thus allowing some defendants to avoid
proper punishment. Nevertheless, social science studies and close analysis
of the procedural setting demonstrate that increasing jury options will
reduce the number of hung juries without necessarily leading to excessive
unmerited compromise.
1. Social science research and reducing hung juries- The social
sciences provide insight into jury deliberations that aids in understanding the effects of different jury instructions. Research in two areas
- increasing the number of options open to jurors, and allowing juries
to return nonunanimous decisions - lend support to the proposition
that disagreement instructions can aid juries in reaching a verdict.
Several experimental jury studies have determined the effect of increasing the jury's verdict options. Although the studies could not replicate
the hung jury situation, they concluded that lesser included offense
deliberation leads to compromise on a lesser offense. 5 4 From this con50. See People v. Mays, 407 Mich. 619, 288 N.W.2d 207 (1980); State v. Ogden, 35 Or.
App. 91, 580 P .2d 1049 (I 978).
51. Mays, 407 Mich. at 623 n.l, 288 N.W.2d at 208 n.l. Oregon's instruction is similar:
"First consider the charge in the accusatory instrument and if [you] cannot agree on a verdict
on this charge, [you] should then consider the lesser included offenses." State v. Ogden, 36 Or.
App. at 98, 580 P .2d at I 053.
52. In cases where federal judges were motivated more by desperation than by specific judicial
rules, they instructed long-deadlocked juries to try to reach an agreement on any instructed offense, regardless of their lack of agreement on the charged offense. See, e.g., United States
v. Dixon, 507 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976 (1976); United States v. Smoot,
463 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Singleton, 447 F. Supp. 852 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
The more common federal policy is use of the "aquittal" instruction. See supra notes 25-26.
53. See infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text.
54. See Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of
Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 211 (1972) (In 54% of the mock trials,
the jury acquitted when the choice in a homicide trial was guilty of first-degree murder or not
guilty. When the jury had four options, they returned verdicts of first-degree murder in 8%
of the cases, second-degree murder in 63%, manslaughter in 21 %, and not guilty in 8%). Many
researchers have replicated aspects of Professor Vidmar's study and found analogous results.
See Hamilton, Obedience and Responsibility: A Jury Simulation, 36 PERSONALITY & Soc.
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clusion one can infer that the disagreement instruction can reduce hung
juries. If mock jurors are choosing from a range of verdicts and reaching
agreement, this indicates that more options change the substance of
deliberations and that new discussion on the lesser offense can lead to
an otherwise unobtainable unanimity.
Following the 1972 Supreme Court decisions holding that jury verdicts in state criminal cases need not be unanimous, 55 many researchers
sought to determine the effect a nonunanimous verdict has on
deliberations. 56 These studies concluded that changing the decision rule
to nonunanimous final verdicts reduced the number of hung juries. 57
A disagreement instruction, like a jury that need not be unanimous, can
alter the decision rule by promoting discussion on more ways to reach
a verdict and by giving the jury the option of agreeing on an offense
with fewer elements. 58 Investigations of jury decision making in civil
PSYCHOLOGY 126 (1978); Kaplan & Simon, Latitude and Severity of Sentencing Option, Race

of the Victim and Decisions of Simulated Jurors: Some Issues Arising From the "Algiers Motel"
Trial, 7 LAW & Soc'y REv. 87 (1972); Roberts, Hoffman & Johnson, Effects of Jury Deliberation on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors: Vidmar Revisited, 47 PERCEP& MOTOR SKILLS 119 (1978).
55. These decisions were Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 365 (1972), and Apodaca v. Oregon,
406 U.S. 404 (1972). Although unanimity is not a constitutional requirement, only six states
allow less-than-unanimous final jury verdicts in criminal cases. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 7;
LA. CONST. art. I, § 17; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 23; OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19; OR. CONST.
art. I,§ 11, TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13. With the exception of Louisiana and Oregon, nonunanimous
verdicts are allowed only in certain circumstances, usually for minor offenses. See generally Israel,
On Recognizing Variations in State Criminal Procedure, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 467 (1982).
56. See, e.g., Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt & Meek, The Decision Processes of6- and 12-Person
Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and 2/3 Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY
1 (1975); Foss, Structural Effects in Simulated Jury Decision Making, 40 J. PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOLOGY 1055 (1981); Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority vs.
Unanimous Decision Rules, 7 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 38 (1977); Saks & Ostrum, Jury
Size and Consensus Requirements: The Laws of Probability v. the Laws of the Land, I J.
CoNTEMP. L. 163 (1975).
57. On the basis of Kalven and Zeisel's limited observations, they predict that non unanimous
. jury verdicts reduce hung juries by 450Jo. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 461; see also
supra note 11. Professor Saks, in his review of the unanimous-nonunanimous jury verdict studies,
concluded that "[u]nanimous juries, in comparison to quorum juries, deliberate longer, [and]
are more likely to hang." M. SAKS, JURY VERDICTS 105 (1977). See also Foss, supra note
56 (using simulated jurors, this study found that juries rendering 10-2 verdicts made decisions
twice as quickly and were much less likely to hang than juries with a unanimity requirement);
Kerr, Atkin, Strasser, Meek, Holt & Davis, Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Effects of Concept Definition and Assigned Decision Rule on the Judgments of Mock Jurors, 34 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 282 (1976) (study of IOI six-person mock juries composed of
undergraduate students, with a 30-minute limit on deliberations, found that the requirement of
unanimity resulted in almost four times as many hung juries; when hung juries were eliminated
from the analysis, the decision rule did not have a significant effect on verdicts).
Professor Michael Saks summarized the research findings: "As a consequence of reduced [social
decision rules), fewer hung juries are anticipated not only by the mathematical model, but also
by the litigants, all members of the [Supreme) Court, and every other commentator I have encountered on the unanimity-nonunanimity debate." M. SAKS, supra, at 29.
58. See supra notes 23-27, 30-31 & 54 and accompanying text.
Some commentators have suggested that "lowering the barriers" to consensus infringes on
TUAL
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litigation indicate that more discussion options may help juries reach decisions in more cases. 59
protections of the accused, either by effectively lowering the standard for guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt or by providing prosecutors with a conviction when they did not meet their burdens. Professors Saks and Hastie explained the effects of reducing the social decision rule from unanimity
to quorum:
Quorum juries are more likely to produce verdicts as opposed to hanging; this is accomplished by reaching decisions on the basis of weaker evidence; and this means that
more errors of both types will occur: convictions when the correct decision is acquittal;
acquittals· when the correct decision is conviction. Increased efficiency is purchased at
some cost in accuracy. In practice, then, a relaxation in the decision rule should be
expected to produce a reduction in the rate of convictions, since most trials currently
result in convictions. The decrease, however, is a result of increased error.
M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, supra note 12, at 84-85 (emphasis in original).
The possibility of erroneous results is an important concern when the issue is reducing the
size of the jury, see Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research
and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 644, 668-84 (1975), or reducing the decision rule
to allow nonunanimous verdicts, see M. SAKS, supra note 57, at 24-31. By changing the agenda
of the jury through lesser included offense instructions which promote compromise, defendants
found innocent might now be found guilty of lesser offenses. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note
54, at 215 (finding that mock jurors with a choice of guilt of first-degree murder or not guilty
convicted in 46% of the trials and acquitted in 54%; mock jurors given a choice of guilty of
first-degree murder, second-degree murder, manslaughter, and not guilty, acquitted in only
8 % of the cases).
Even if juror compromise is conviction prone, the fairness of the outcome is not compromised.
Jurors generally decide cases on the merits and take their duties seriously, so a different agenda
should not cause them to evaluate the substantive issues differently. See infra notes 71-84 and
accompanying text.
The reasons for increased error under altered decision rules are not created by giving the jury
more options during deadlocks. In cases with six-person juries, the possibility for error exists
because minority views may not be represented, and because dissent by only one juror is more
frequent. Sole dissenters may acquiesce faster than groups of dissenters. With a quorum decision
rule, the minority is overridden even if it does not choose to acquiesce. Opening discussion to
several different offenses should increase the fairness of the deliberation process by assuring
that the jury has the opportunity to match the defendant's conviction with actual culpability.
See SA J. MOORE, supra note 19, 131.03[1]; Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra of Lesser Included
Offenses: A Herculean Task for Michigan Courts, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 41, 52.
59. The persuasive techniques used by jurors to reach a consensus on a verdict differ from
when the result sought is a damage award. A verdict decision is a dichotomy; jurors can acquit
or convict. A damage amount, however, is a continuum; jurors can favor any figure ranging
from zero dollars to the maximum amount. In arriving at a damage award, there are more options to choose from and more techniques of persuasion may be employed to reach a result.
As part of the Chicago Jury Project, see supra note 9, Hawkins studied the deliberations of
46 mock juries made up from jury pools, who listened to a tape-recorded personal injury trial.
"When jurors differed in their opinions on damages, they could settle their differences by bargaining. On liability, on the other hand, if they once became openly aligned on the issue, differences
of opinion could be settled only by a complete capitulation of one side." C. Hawkins, Interaction and Coalition Realignments in Consensus-Seeking Groups: A Study of Experimental Jury
Deliberations (Aug. 17, 1960) (unpublished thesis). "A continuum may develop (i.e., $5,000;
$10,000; $15,000) in deciding damages for the plaintiff, and bargaining and compromise may
take place within the deliberations to arrive at an equitable settlement." Kessler, The Social Psychology of Jury Deliberations, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICAN 67, 86 (R. Simon ed. 1975)
(citing C. Hawkins, supra, at 58-59). The ability of jurors to resolve their differences by compromise relies on having a range of decisions to choose from. This analysis was developed in
cases involving money damages, "but it might also apply where a jury must resolve multiple
counts or choose the appropriate level of an offense." Lempert, supra note 58, at 680.
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2. The potential for reducing hung juries- An instruction promoting compromise on lesser included offenses has the potential to
reduce significantly the number of hung juries. Several factors indicate
that most hung juries occur in cases where discussion of lesser included offenses may be available but is prohibited by restrictive judicial
instructions. First, most criminal codes are composed of relatively few
offense categories but many of these contain several grades of an offense based on the seriousness of conduct. 60 When the prosecutor charges
the defendant with a serious grade of offense, the lower grades often
constitute lesser included offenses and could easily become a part of
jury deliberations. 61
Second, most defendants are initially charged with the most serious
offense within an offense category that the prosecutor feels can be found
on the evidence to be presented at trial. 62 Consequently, charge reduction is often used when prosecutors are overzealous; the same outcome
can result if the jury can have this option available in deliberations.
Third, those few defendants brought to trial are charged with relatively
serious offenses. 63 When they arrive at trial, they may be convicted of
60. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 43-2150 (1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II,§ 4201 (1979);
KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-4501 (1981); VA. CODE§ 18.2-9 (1982); see also J. LEVINE, M. MUSHEMO
& D. PALUMBO, CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A PUBLIC POLICY APPROACH 206-07 (1980) (giving the
hypothetical example of how a drunk who mugs someone on a subway with a gun may be charged
with as many as seven different crimes).
61. For example, a defendant accused of rape under such a statute may be cnargeu w1L11
one or more degrees of criminal sexual conduct. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 750.520(a)(e) (Supp. 1981) (creating four degrees of criminal sexual conduct). A defendant charged with
one degree of criminal sexual conduct may necessarily be guilty of some lesser degrees. See,
e.g., People v. Thompson, 76 Mich. App. 705, 257 N.W.2d 268 (1977); see also People v. Gorney,
99 Mich. App. 199, 297 N.W.2d 648 (1980). But see, e.g., People v. Green, 86 Mich. App. 142,
272 N. W.2d 216 (1978) (second degree conduct is a necessarily included offense of first degree
conduct, but neither third nor fourth degree conduct constitutes a necessarily included offense
of first or second degree conduct).
62. Concerning the decision whether to charge, Professors Michael and Don Gottfredson
cite among the goals of the prosecutor's charging decisions, utilization of resources and "the
desire to support the police informant network or to accomodate the prosecution of more significant 'higher ups' in a criminal conspiracy." M. GOTTFREDSON & D. GoTTFREDSON, DECISIONMAKING IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 150 (1980). They also cite a U.S. Department of Justice study of
charge dismissal in Los Angeles County where, based on 78,000 arrests, "most of the rejected
felony arrests were based on a lack of evidence and the district attorney's belief that the case
was not serious enough to warrant felony processing." Id. at 158 (citing P. GREENWOOD, S.
WILDHORN, E. POGGIN, M. STRUMWASSER & P. DELEON, PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN Los ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (1973)).
Prosecutors have little to lose during the decision of what to charge by overcharging. Prosecutors always have the option of reducing charges on their own initiative if they erred in their
judgments and cannot prove guilt. See J. LEVINE, M. MusHENO & D. PALUMBO, supra note 60,
at 207. Empirical studies indicate the prevalence of charging serious offenses. See Forst & Brosi,
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the Prosecutor, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 177 (1977) (finding
that prosecutors attached the most importance, during the charging decision, to the strength
of the evidence and the seriousness of the case).
63. See M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 102-10 (1978); Katz, Legality and Equality: Plea
Bargaining in the Prosecution of White-Collar and Common Crimes, 13 LAW & Soc'y REv.
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many possible crimes: the charged offense or the less serious included
offenses.
Fourth, after a hung jury the prosecutor often chooses to pursue a
retrial on a lesser offense. 64 The disagreement instruction would allow
jurors to make that same decision, but in the course of the first trial. 65
3. When compromise should be a concern- Not withstanding the advantages of reducing hung juries without coercive procedures the increased
opportunity to compromise offered by the disagreement instruction may
result in verdicts motivated by concerns unrelated to the merits of the
case. While studying the Oregon rule allowing ten-two jury verdicts, Professors Kalven and Zeisel found that juries returned non unanimous verdicts in twenty-five percent of the cases, compared with the five percent
national hung jury rate. They attributed this to the practice of stopping
deliberations after reaching the requisite majority. 66 Courts and social
scientists assert that such results may mark the existence of unmerited
compromise or a tendency to ignore the minority in the jury. 67 In People v. Clemente, 68 for instance, the New York Court of Appeals complained that "[the jury] may, on almost any excuse, convict of a lower
degree of crime although conviction of a higher degree is clearly
warranted." 69 Jurors occasionally confirm these fears in post-trial interviews with reporters, sometimes indicating that their decision was
motivated more by a desire to be finished with the trial than with the
proofs offered by each side. 10
431, 443-44 (1979). Heumann and Katz both suggest that time pressures on prosecutors at the
state level require that minor cases be disposed of quickly, either through dismissals or guilty
pleas. State prosecutors are organized to respond to the police, who in turn respond to the citizenry.
Federal prosecutors have greater potential for determining the composition and size of their
caseloads. See Hogan & Bernstein, The Sentence Bargaining of Upperworld and Underworld
Crime in Ten Federal District Courts, 13 LAw & Soc'y REv. 467, 467-70 (1979). Even at the
federal level, however, prosecutors select the serious cases to bring to trial. See Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Qualitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U.
CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980).
64. See Fried, Kaplan & Klein, Juror Selection: An Analysis of Voir Dire, in THE JURY SYSTEM
IN AMERICA 54 (R. Simon ed. 1975) (noting that the prosecutor "will typically drastically reduce
the charges after a single hung jury outcome").
65. See generally Comment, supra note 19, at 588.
66. Kalven & Zeise!, The American Jury: Notes for an English Controversy, 48 CHI. B.
REc. 195, 201 (1967).
67. See, e.g., M. SAKS, supra note 57, at 20-24 (suggesting that communication to and from
minority jurors decreases when their views cannot affect the final decision); Nemeth, supra note
56 (finding that, in three studies of unanimous versus quorum verdicts, verdicts did not change
but the unanimous juries reported reaching a full consensus, more confidence in the verdict,
and a feeling that justice had been administered).
68. 285 A.D. 258, 136 N.Y.S.2d 202 (1954).
69. Id. at 264, 136 N.Y.S.2d at 207.
70. Anecdotal evidence in the form of juror interviews after publicized trials provide examples of how juror yotes may be cast without regard to guilt or innocence. During deliberations
in the murder trial of Juan Corona, a holdout juror for acquittal at one time in the deliberations
said: "Please, I'll change my vote. Just don't hate me. I'll change my vote so you can go
home to your wife." Wrightsman, The American Trial Jury on Trial: Empirical Evidence and

Improving Jury Deliberations

SPRING 1983)

579

If juror compromise unrelated to the merits of the case occurs when
judges offer juries the extensive deliberative discretion provided by the
disagreement instruction, most courts are correct in refusing to give it.
Nevertheless, a close examination of the existence and effects of the sort
of compromise promoted by the disagreement instruction indicates that
compromise verdicts should not compel rejection of the disagreement
instruction.

C.

A voiding Unmerited Compromise

The disagreement instruction offers a method for preventing hung juries
and juror coercion, but at the risk of unmerited compromise. Close examination, however, indicates that unmerited compromise rarely arises
and even when it does, it may be desirable for equitable reasons. On
balance, the benefits of promoting this kind of compromise outweigh
the coercion inherent in other instructions as well as the minimal risk
of unmerited compromise.
1. The occurrence of compromise- The process of jury deliberations has received extensive attention. Although many studies of jury
deliberations do not specifically consider the effects of different lesser
included offense instructions, their results are relevant in determining
whether jurors will overcome the temptation to compromise too quickly
and render a verdict that adequately considers the charged offense.
Some unmerited compromise will invariably occur; jurors sometimes
do make quick compromises for reasons unrelated to the merits. Interviews with jurors after controversial trials demonstrate that juries
sometimes compromise for the wrong reasons. 11 Some experimental
studies with mock juries indicate that the examples may not be atypical
and that certain factors unrelated to the issues preoccupy some jurors. 72
The number of trials in which unmerited compromise will determine the
Procedural Modifications, 34 J. Soc. ISSUES 137, 157 (1978) (citing V. VILLASENOR, JURY: THE
PEOPLE VS. JUAN CORONA (1977)).
During the trial of the Harrisburg Seven, some jurors characterized the deliberations as
" 'blurred, quarreling, timeless periods of irrational arguments,' during which two jurors nearly
came to blows and another kept referring to himself as 'serving God's wiJJ.' " J. LEVINE, M.
MusHENO & D. PALUMBO, supra note 60, at 290-91 (citing Village Voice, Feb. 8, 1973, at 9).
See also H. ABRAHAM, supra note 8, at 136 (offering the example of a young mother on a jury
who voted to convict the defendant of rape against her better judgment: "I knew I had those
children at home and we would never get out of there if we tried to argue it out with the others.").
See also M. SAKs, supra note 57, at 3.
71. See supra note 70.
72. See, e.g., Padawer-Singer & Barton, The Impact of Pretrial Publicity on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 123 (R. Simon ed. 1975) (using real jurors and a videotaped
trial, the authors in this simulated jury study found that juries exposed to pretrial publicity,
in the form of the defendant's prior criminal record and alleged repudiated confession, were
more likely to convict than unexposed jurors); James, Status and Competence of Jurors, 64
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verdict, however, is probably insignificant, according to experimental
studies, studies of actual jury behavior, and case examples.
Experimental studies do not provide a sufficient basis for demonstrating
that unmerited compromise is significant. First, the results of the studies
are at best divided. Indeed, in contrast to some earlier, less elaborate
studies, 73 recent mock jury studies have found that jurors base their decisions on the evidence and the facts of the case. 74 Second, experimental
studies cannot duplicate the experience of serving on a jury. The common caution with experimental studies applies; experiments cannot
replicate actual involvement in the situation. 75 Indeed, real jurors may
perform better than mock jurors because of the seriousness and responsibility that accompany a real trial. 76
Studies of actual jury behavior, drawn from real cases, provide the
best support that the jury makes its decisions based on the evidence.
AM. J. Soc. 563 (1959) (This often-cited experimental study found that about 50% of the comments made during deliberations were expressions of opinions or recountings of personal experiences. Only 15% of the time was spent on testimony; 25% was spent discussing procedural
issues and 8% was spent on judge's instructions.).
A review of mock jury studies concluded: "[S]ome degree of generalizability seems cautiously
appropriate. It appears that extraevidential factors, such as defendant, victim, and juror
characteristics, trial procedures, and so forth, can influence the severity of verdicts rendered
by individual jurors." Gerbasi, Zuckerman & Reis, Justice Needs a New Blindfold: A Review
of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. 323, 343 (1977); see also Wrightsman, supra
note 70, at 152 (drawing the conclusion that "the consistency of findings [in studies on the effects
of litigant characteristics on jurors] should question the assumption that jurors process information in a rational, objective manner, uninfluenced by characteristics of the defendant, witnesses,
or attorneys") (summarizing the conclusion of Stephan, Selection Characteristics of Jurors and
Litigants: Their Influences on Juries' Verdicts, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 97 (R. Simon
ed. 1975)).
73. The best example of this is contained in the research of Professor Rita James Simon.
Her 1959 mock jury study, see supra note 72, is often offered as evidence that juries do not
base their decisions on the issues, See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 59, at 84; Wrightsman, supra
note 70, at 154. Professor Simon recanted this belief in her 1967 study of jury deliberations
on the insanity defense. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 175 (1967).
74. Some reviews of experimental jury studies conclude that "for the most part juries are
able and willing to put aside extraneous information and base their decisions on the evidence.
The results show that when ordinary citizens become jurors, they assume a special role in which
they apply different standards of proof, more vigorous reasoning and greater detachment." Simon,
Does the Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REv. 515, 528 (1977). From their review of
the experimental research, Professors Saks and Hastie conclude: "The studies are unanimous
in showing that evidence is a substantially more potent determinant of jurors' verdicts than
the individual characteristics of jurors." M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, supra note 12, at 68. Professor
Simon also performed a study on the jury's ability to understand and apply the insanity defense.
Based on the results of actual trials, she concluded that "[t]he jurors relied very heavily on the
record. They reviewed every piece of evidence presented during the trial." R. SIMON, supra note
33_, at 175.
75. See, e.g., Lempert, supra note 58, at 802-03; Simon, supra note 74, at 520.
76. Professor Simon explains one of the conclusions of the Chicago Jury Project:
Jurors take their responsibility seriously; they check prejudices at the door of the jury
room and recognize their special role as temporary members of the judiciary bound
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Although data of this sort is difficult to obtain, 77 the Chicago Jury Project provides enough of a research effort to determine what the American
jury does in a real criminal trial. 78 The Project found that the jury's verdict
agreed with how the judge would have decided the case in eighty percent of the cases. 79 Based on the high percentage of agreements and on
the reasons for the twenty percent disagreement - sentiments on the law,
sentiments on the defendant, issues concerning evidence 80 - the study's
directors claimed that the results were "a stunning refutation of the
hypothesis that the jury does not understand [the case].' ' 8 ' On the strength
of these findings, the Supreme Court required that states uphold the right
to a jury trial in criminal cases and affirmed its confidence in the jury's
ability to decide cases accurately and rationally. 82
Examples of celebrated case results in recent years substantiate the conclusions of the researchers. Although the correctness of -the results in
these individual cases cannot be systematically analyzed, extensive media
coverage offers much data by which to evaluate those cases. Since the
late 1960's, most controversial trials have been jury trials, including the
trials of the Chicago Seven, Huey Newton, Angela Davis, the Harrisburg
Thirteen, Mitchell-Stans, and John Ehrlichman. Regardless of the
political popularity of each decision, the public and the press, as well
as the bench and bar, generally accepted the correctness and legitimacy
of the jury decisions. 83 In addition, a survey by the Law Reform Commission of Canada indicated that ninety-six percent of jurors surveyed
held a favorable view of the jury system. 84
These measures of jury performance show that juries are capable of
handling discretion. Nevertheless, the existence of unmerited compromise
in some cases requires an evaluation of whether these cases, though infrequent, may still be unacceptable.
2. The desirability of compromise- Enhancing the jury's ability to
compromise, even in cases where the compromise is inconsistent with
by rules of law and procedures not present in their business transactions or informal
conversations. Ordinary citizens are willing to accept these legal trappings and work
within them. The fears voiced by critics that jurors make capricious decisions because
of bias, incompetence and irrelevent factors have not been substantiated.
Simon, supra note 74, at 520.
77. See D. GILLMOR, supra note 9, at 195-208 (describing difficulties that legal and social
science researchers have encountered in attempting to determine the content of jury deliberations).
78. For a description of the Project's methodology, see supra note 9. The main findings
are reported in H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7.
79. H. KAI.VEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 56.
80. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
81. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 157.
82. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157 (1968).
83. R. SIMON, Introduction to THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICAN 13 (R. Simon ed. 1975).
84. LAW REFORM CoMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 2.
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the evidence, can serve important functions. The Chicago Jury Project
found that in the twenty percent of the cases in which the jury and the
judge disagreed, 85 the jury based its decision on the equities of the case. 86
In most instances, the jury acquitted defendants that the judge would
have convicted. 87 The jury acquitted defendants in these cases for a variety
of equitable reasons: the defendant was the subject of unfairness due
to mistreatment by the police or prosecutorial vindictiveness; the defendant had already suffered enough; little blameworthiness was attached
to the conduct charged because the victim contributed to the offense or
the act was out of character for the defendant; or the harm caused by
the defendant was small. 88
Giving the jury the right to administer the conscience of the community
should not be discouraged. This view was echoed by the Supreme Court
in Duncan v. Louisiana 89 where it held that the sixth amendment right
to a jury trial applied to state criminal trials. In reflecting on the history
of the right to a jury trial, the Court envisioned the jury as doing more
than finding facts: "[a] right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression by the Government. ... [The jury
trial is] an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased or eccentric judge. " 90
• Although jury compromises unrelated to the merits of the case do
occur, they are far more often based on principles of fairness and equity than on irresponsibility. As the Law Reform Commission of Canada
concluded, it is impossible to qualify the nonevidentiary compromises
motivated by equity from those motivated by prejudice, but jury deviations from the law most often occur because of equitable concerns. 91
CONCLUSION

Hung juries damage the credibility of the criminal justice system. They
leave society frustrated with the trial process, increase anxiety among
defendants, and waste resources. The threat of a hung jury mandates
action by juries and judges that is often neither desirable nor effective.
Instructions to break deadlocks may threaten the autonomy and confidence of minority jurors and interfere with the deliberative process.
With proper lesser included offense instructions, however, judges can
foster a sense of cooperation and compromise that can lead to procedural85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See supra notes 86-88.
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 7, at 286-87, 492, 498-99.
Id. at 58-59.
See supra note 86. See also LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 9-10.
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 155-56.
LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CANADA, supra note 12, at 11.
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ly and substantively fair verdicts. It is not risky to give jurors this power
to compromise. The adversary system has assumed that the jury is capable
of handling such power and modern investigations have supported this
assumption. Judges should not continue to neglect opportunities like lesser
included offense instructions to aid the jury's deliberative process. The
jury can use the "disagreement" lesser included offense instruction to
reach a compromise without caprice, and a consensus without coercion.

-Michael D. Craig

